Nell’articolata analisi della tesi di dottorato (2021), l’autrice era pervenuta a rintracciare nel καυχάομαι l’inscrizione del profilo fondativo dell’identità credente, che Paolo dispone in una sorta di percorso testuale lungo Rm 1‒5. L’articolo presenta la sintesi della ricerca precedente, riaprendo il confronto con i contributi successivi alla sua stesura ed in particolare con quelli della prospettiva di Paul within Judaism. Il dialogo con il recente studio di John M.G. BARCLAY, Paul and the Power of Grace, in sede conclusiva conferma il (...) guadagno dell’indagine in ordine agli sviluppi della soteriologia paolina. (shrink)

In this commentary, I consider how Giulia Cavaliere’s arguments about the limited reach of the current justifications offered for full ectogenesis in the bioethical literature apply in the context of partial ectogenesis. I suggest that considering the extent to which partial ectogenesis is freedom or equality promoting is more urgent because of the more realistic prospect of artificial womb technology being utilised to facilitate partial gestation extra uterum as opposed to facilitating complete gestation from conception to term. I highlight concerns (...) about potentially harmful social narratives surrounding pregnancy and about the current legal framework surrounding gestation limiting access to technology in the advent of partial ectogenesis. I do not advocate that these concerns mean that we ought not develop artificial wombs, but like Cavaliere I suggest that we must be mindful of these concerns, and I posit that legal reform must accompany technological developments. Ectogenesis as a political perspective, through which we consider the value in social reproduction and the experiences of pregnant people, is useful to prevent political capture of this technology for regressive policies. Using this perspective to examine the law is also a useful tool to expose just how restrictive the law is in relation to gestation and female reproductive health. (shrink)

In a recent publication, I argued that there is a conceptual difference between artificial womb (AW) technology, capable of facilitating gestation ex utero, and neonatal intensive care, providing incubation to neonates born prematurely. One of the reasons I provided for this distinction was that the subjects of each process are different entities. The subject of the process of gestation ex utero is a unique human entity: a ‘gestateling’, rather than a fetus or a newborn preterm neonate. Nick Colgrove wrote a (...) response to my paper, claiming that my distinction between the subject of an AW and a newborn (in intensive care) was false. He claims that I have not accounted for the proper definition of ‘birth’ and that gestatelings are not a distinct product of human reproduction. Further, Colgrove posits that even if I can successfully distinguish gestatelings from preterms, such a distinction is morally irrelevant because the entities would have the same moral status. In this paper, I address the three challenges raised and defend the claim that gestatelings are unique entities. Moreover, I argue that moral status should not be considered ipso facto determinative in the debate about AWs. (shrink)

In their paper, ‘How to reach trustworthy decisions for caesarean sections on maternal request: a call for beneficial power’, Eide and Bærøe present maternal request caesarean sections (MRCS) as a site of conflict in obstetrics because birthing people are seeking access to a treatment ‘without any anticipated medical benefit’. While I agree with the conclusions of their paper -that there is a need to reform the approach to MRCS counselling to ensure that the structural vulnerability of pregnant people making birth (...) decisions is addressed—I disagree with the framing of MRCS as having ‘no anticipated medical benefit’. I argue that MRCS is often inappropriately presented as unduly risky,without supporting empirical evidence,and that MRCS is most often sought by birthing people on the basis of a clinical need. I argue that there needs to be open conversation and frank willingness to acknowledge the values that are currently underpinning the presentation of MRCS as ‘clinically unnecessary’; specifically there needs to be more discussion of where and why the benefits of MRCS that are recognised by individual birthing people are not recognised by clinicians. This is important to ensure access to MRCS for birthing people that need it. (shrink)

A large body of literature considers the ethico-legal and regulatory issues surrounding assisted conception. Surrogacy, however, within this body of literature is an odd-fit. It involves a unique demand of another person—a form of reproductive labour—that many other aspects of assisted conception, such as gamete donation do not involve. Surrogacy is a form of assisted gestation. The potential alternatives for individuals who want a genetically related child but who do not have the capacity to gestate are ever increasing: with the (...) advent of uterus transplantation, and the anticipated development of artificial placentas.In this paper, I highlight the pertinent conceptual differences between technologies assisting conception and those assisting gestation to demonstrate that distinct issues arise when assisted gestative technologies are used. I argue that there is utility in considering AGTs as a genus of technologies. These technologies perform the same function from the perspective of putative parents and might exist on a spectrum of alternatives when they become more available. Moreover, since many of the same or very similar ethical, social and legal issues are raised by surrogacy, UTx and ectogestation, analysis of these issues will be better contextualised by considering these technologies together. Many of the matters currently being highlighted for reform in the context of surrogacy will inevitably impact on how other forms of assisted gestation are governed. The conversation should be broadened; we should consider how far other emerging technologies might be accommodated in revised regulatory schemes. (shrink)

In this paper, I explore how viability, meaning the ability of the fetus to survive post-delivery, features in the law regulating abortion provision in England and Wales and the USA. I demonstrate that viability is formalized differently in the criminal law in England and Wales and the USA, such that it is quantified and defined differently. I consider how the law might be applied to the examples of artificial womb technology and anencephalic fetuses. I conclude that there is incoherence in (...) the meaning of viability and argue that it is thus a conceptually illegitimate basis on which to ground abortion regulation. This is both because of the fluidity of the concept and because how it has been thus far understood in the law is unsupported by medical realities. Furthermore, it has the effect of heavily diluting pregnant people’s rights with overly moralistic limitations on access to healthcare. (shrink)

In the United Kingdom the law and medical guidance is supportive of women making choices in childbirth. NICE guidelines are explicit that a competent woman’s informed request for MRCS should be respected. However, in reality pregnant women are routinely denied MRCS. In this paper I consider whether there is sufficient justification for restricting MRCS. The physical and emotive significance of childbirth as an event in a woman’s life cannot be understated. It is, therefore, concerning that women are having their wishes (...) ignored, and we must ascertain whether the denial of agency is justifiable. To answer this question I first demonstrate that access to MRCS is a lottery in the UK. Second, I argue that there is nothing unique about pregnancy that displaces the ethical norm of respecting patents’ sufficiently autonomous choices. Thus, the starting presumption is that all informed choices regarding MRCS should be respected. To ascertain whether any restriction of MRCS is justifiable the burden of proof must be placed on those who argue that MRCS is ethically impermissible. I argue that the most common justifications in the literature against MRCS are insufficient to displace the presumption in favour of autonomous choice in childbirth. I conclude that MRCS should be available to pregnant women, and we must strive to reduce the lottery in access to choice. (shrink)

In 2017 and 2019, two research teams claimed ‘proof of principle’ for artificial womb technology (AWT). AWT has long been a subject of speculation in bioethical literature, with broad consensus that it is a welcome development. Despite this, little attention is afforded to more immediate ethical problems in the development of AWT, particularly as an alternative to neonatal intensive care. To start this conversation, I consider whether experimental AWT is innovative treatment or medical research. The research–treatment distinction, pervasive in regulation (...) worldwide, is intended to isolate research activities and subject them to a greater degree of oversight. I argue that there is a tendency in the literature to conceptualize AWT for partial ectogenesis as innovative treatment. However, there are sufficiently serious ethical concerns with experimental AWT that mean that it must not be first used on humans on the basis that it is a ‘beneficial treatment’. First, I outline the prospects for translation of AWT animal studies into treatment for human preterms. Second, I challenge the conceptualizations of experimental AWT as innovative treatment. It must be considered medical research to reflect the investigatory nature of the process and guarantee sufficient protections for subjects. Identifying that AWT is research is crucial in formulating further ethico‐legal questions regarding the experimental use of AWT. Third, I demonstrate that clinical trials will be a necessary part of the clinical translation of AWT because of requirements laid out by regulators. I consider the justification for clinical trials and highlight some of the crucial ethical questions about the conditions under which they should proceed. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This article deals with the most important points of contact between feeling and cognition in the thought of Félicité de Lamennais. The following arguments are focused on: i. the central role of love; ii. the advocacy of self-denial, taking the shape of a denunciation of earthly pleasures and passions, especially pride; iii. a failure to endorse moral pluralism; iv. the necessity for people to fulfil their ‘duties’; v. a view of the post-revolutionary phase as fateful; and vi. a tendency (...) to criticise and antagonise. It emerges that Lamennais the pious believer, extolling the authority of the Church (i.–iii.), always coexisted with Lamennais the revolutionary, preaching religious and political subversion (iv.–vi.). He spread the same affective tropes, although in different doses, over the various phases of his career. (shrink)

We prove that everyn-modal logic betweenKnandS5nis undecidable, whenever n ≥ 3. We also show that each of these logics is non-finitely axiomatizable, lacks the product finite model property, and there is no algorithm deciding whether a finite frame validates the logic. These results answer several questions of Gabbay and Shehtman. The proofs combine the modal logic technique of Yankov–Fine frame formulas with algebraic logic results of Halmos, Johnson and Monk, and give a reduction of the representation problem of finite relation (...) algebras. (shrink)

Fra gli arredi marmorei di età romana si distingue un gruppo di sostegni realizzati in marmo Giallo antico, che presentano caratteristiche comuni di lavorazione e di decorazione, i cui esemplari sono stati ritrovati nel Mediterraneo occidentale (Sardegna, Francia meridionale, Spagna), con una concentrazione in alcuni centri antichi. Si propongono considerazioni su produzione, circolazione e riuso di questi oggetti di lusso.

Öz Bu çalışmada, küreselleşme olgusunun sanatla ilişkisi sorgulanmıştır. Küreselleşmenin, homojenleşme, kutuplaşma, hibritleşme gibi kültürel getirileri, sanata yeni bir kimlik kazandırmıştır. Çağdaş sanat olarak tanımlanan bu yeni kimlik, disiplinlerarası, çok kültürlülük özelliği taşıyan, zaman, mekan kavramından bağımsız, anlatım ve plastik dil açısından çok çeşitlilik içeren bir yapıya sahiptir. Sanat, ilk çağlardan beri insanların doğa karşısında güçlü olmalarını ve kendilerini ifade etmelerini sağlayan kültürel bir güçtür. İletişim Kuramcısı McLuhan’a göre kültürün belirleyici ilkesi, içeriginden cok iletildigi aracmm niteligi ile ilgilidir(Eşkinat. 1998, s.37) Günümüzde (...) kültürün iletenleri olarak dijital teknoloji ve medya çağdaş sanatın en önemli belirleyenleridir.Çağdaş sanat, iletişim, teknolojlerindeki gelişme ile hız faktörünü kazanarak zaman ve mekandan bağımsızlaşmıştır. Sanatçının kendisi de bir ileten olarak ön plana çıkmıştır. Çeşitli özellikleri ile çağdaş sanat, yaşamın içinde yer almakta ve küreselleşmenin kültürel boyutunun büyük bir bölümünü oluşturmaktadır.Küreselleşme Ekonomik, politik ve sosyo-kültürel yapıların biraraya gelmesi ve yeni iletişim teknolojilerinin küresel kullanımıyla oluşur(Erdoğan. 2013, s.76).Bu çalışmada çağdaş sanatın ekonomik sistem ile bütüncül bir yapı oluşturduğu vurgulanmıştır. Bu bütüncül yapı içinde sanatçının kendisinin de sanat üretiminin önemli bir parçası olduğu gözlemlenmiştir.Çağdaş sanat, sanatçı, küratör, çağdaş sanat fuarları ve bienaller, küreselleşme olgusu üzerinden incelenmiştir. Çalışmanın amacı; çağdaş sanatın, küreselleşmenin önemli bir dinamiği olduğunu ortaya koymaktır. Çalışma, belirlenen problem çerçevesinde literatür araştırması yapılıp, kaynak tarama modeli kullanılarak yürütülmüştür. Anahtar Kelimeler : Küreselleşme,Küreselleşmenin boyutları,Çağdaş sanat,Kültür endüstrisi,KüratörAbstract In this study, the relationship between globalization and art was examined. The cultural connotations of globalization, such as homogenization, polarization, and hybridization, have given a new identity to art. This new identity, defined as contemporary art, has a multidisciplinary structure that is independent of time, space and diverse in terms of expression and plastic language. Art is a cultural power that has enabled people to be strong against nature and to express themselves since the earliest ages. According to the Communication Theorist McLuhan, the culturally determinant principle is concerned with the quality of the means in which it is transmitted (Eskinat.1998, s. 37). Digital technology and media are important determinants of contemporary art. Contemporary art has become independent of time and space by acquiring the speed with the development of communication, technologies. The artist himself has also come to the forefront as a conductor. Contemporary art with its various features takes part in life and forms a large part of the cultural dimension of globalization. Globalization occurs with a combination of economic, political and socio-cultural structures and the global use of new communication technologies (Erdoğan. 2013, s. 76). It is emphasized that modern art forms an integrated structure with the economic system. It is observed that the artist himself is an important part of the art production in this whole structure. Contemporary art, artists, curators, contemporary art fairs and biennials have been studied through the phenomenon of globalization. Purpose of the study is to provide evidence for the fact that contemporary art is an important dynamism of globalization. The study was carried out using literature review model in the framework of the identified problem. Keywords : Globalization, Dimensions of globalization,Contemporary art, Culture industry,Curator. (shrink)

El objetivo del libro no es otro, pues, que «retracer l’histoire de l’alchimie au Moye Âge». De acuerdo con esta perspectiva histórica, el libro esta estructurado en cuatro grandes capítulos. Primero: La réception de l’alchimie arabe au Moyen Âge ; segundo: Les principaux corpus alchimiques arabo-latins ; tercero: L’alchimie latine y, finalmente, el cuarto: L’alchimie à la fin du Moyen Âge: La transition vers la Renaissance. Una introducción, la conclusión, veinte páginas de bibliografia, el index nominum i el general completan (...) el libro. (shrink)

In this paper, a mathematical model was used to evaluate a dynamical hybrid system for optimizing and controlling the efficacy of plant-based protein in aquafeeds. Fishmeal, raw rapeseed meal, and a fermented meal with yeast and fungi were used as test ingredients for the determination of apparent digestibility coefficients of dry matter, crude protein, crude lipid, energy, and essential amino acids for olive flounder using diets containing 0.5% Cr2O3 as an inert indicator. Among all ingredients tested, FM had the maximum (...) ADC of dry matter, and energy. Fermented meals showed higher ADC. Amino acid digestibility reflects protein digestibility in most cases. Interestingly, protease, lipase, and amylase activities were better expressed in RM-Koji, RM-Yeast, and FM over RM, respectively. The current results deliver important information on nutrients and energy bioavailability in raw and fermented RM, which can be implemented to accurately formulate applied feeds for olive flounder. Compared with other applicable systems, the complexity of the approach implemented has been considerably reduced. (shrink)

It is demonstrated that we can represent Euler's φ-function by means of a Δ0-formula in such a way that the theory IΔ 0 proves the recursion equations that are characteristic for this function.

Recently, I argued that human subjects in artificial wombs (AWs) “share the same moral status as newborns” and so, deserve the same treatment and protections as newborns. This thesis rests on two claims: (A) “Subjects of partial ectogenesis—those that develop in utero for at time before being transferred to AWs—are newborns,” and (B) “Subjects of complete ectogenesis—those who develop in AWs entirely—share the same moral status as newborns.” In response, Elizabeth Chloe Romanis argued that the subject in an AW is (...) “a unique human entity…rather than a fetus or a newborn.” She provides four lines of response to my essay. First, she argues that I have “misconstrued” what birth is. Once we correct that error, it becomes clear that subjects of partial ectogenesis have not been born. Second, she argues that my claims imply that non-implanted embryos (existing in vivo) “would also be ‘born.’” But that is absurd. Third, she claims I fail to “meaningfully respond” to distinctions she draws between subjects of ectogenesis and neonates. Finally, she criticizes my essay for focusing on subjects of AWs rather than focusing on pregnant persons (who should be at the “centre” of debates over AWs). I respond to each of these charges. In doing so, I reaffirm that (contra Romanis) some subjects of ectogenesis are newborns and all subjects of ectogenesis—even those that have not been born—share the same moral status as newborns. (shrink)

Recently, I argued that human subjects in artificial wombs ‘share the same moral status as newborns’ and so, deserve the same treatment and protections as newborns. This thesis rests on two claims: subjects of partial ectogenesis—those that develop in utero for at time before being transferred to AWs—are newborns and subjects of complete ectogenesis—those who develop in AWs entirely—share the same moral status as newborns. In response, Elizabeth Chloe Romanis argued that the subject in an AW is ‘a unique human (...) entity…rather than a fetus or a newborn’. She provides four lines of response to my essay. First, she argues that I have ‘misconstrued’ what birth is. Once we correct that error, it becomes clear that subjects of partial ectogenesis have not been born. Second, she argues that my claims imply that non-implanted embryos ‘would also be “born”’. But that is absurd. Third, she claims I fail to ‘meaningfully respond’ to distinctions she draws between subjects of ectogenesis and neonates. Finally, she criticises my essay for focusing on subjects of AWs rather than focusing on pregnant persons. I respond to each of these charges. In doing so, I reaffirm that some subjects of ectogenesis are newborns and all subjects of ectogenesis—even those that have not been born—share the same moral status as newborns. (shrink)